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‘Different Trains’: Denise Levertov, Adolf Eichmann and Moral Blindness  
 
 
Denise Levertov was, from the publication of her second book, Here and Now, in 
1957, the most highly regarded female poet of her generation to be identified with 
that American poetic tradition whose exponents variously saw themselves as 
following in the path of William Carlos Williams and Ezra Pound: writers such as 
Robert Creeley, Charles Olson and Robert Duncan, each of whom was associated 
with Black Mountain College and with Donald Allen’s seminal anthology The New 
American Poetry (1960). She corresponded with H. D.1 and was admired by Marianne 
Moore,2 while the poet and critic Kenneth Rexroth called her ‘incomparably the best 
poet of what is getting to be known as the new avant garde’.3 Levertov’s prominence 
was all the more surprising given that she was, as she wrote, ‘Essex-born’,4 and 
moved to the US in 1948, aged twenty-five.5 But as she adjusted her ear to American 
vernacular, she also found her voice—one that was ‘wilfull, tender, evasive,/sad & 
                                                
1 Denise Levertov, ‘H. D.: An Appreciation’ (1962), The Poet in the World (New York 
1973), pp. 244-8. 
2 Marianne Moore, ‘The Ways Our Poets Have Taken in Fifteen Years Since the 
War: Review of The New American Poetry: 1945-1960’ (1960), The Complete Prose, ed. 
Patricia C. Willis (New York 1986), pp. 535-9 (p. 536). 
3 Kenneth Rexroth, ‘The Poetry of Denise Levertov’ (1961), Denise Levertov: Selected 
Criticism, ed. Albert Gelpi (Ann Arbor 1993), pp. 11-4 (p. 11). 
4 Denise Levertov, ‘A Map of the Western Part of the County of Essex in England’, 
Poems 1960-1967 [P] (New York 1983), pp. 21-2 (p. 21). 
5 Donna Krolik Hollenberg, A Poet’s Revolution: The Live of Denise Levertov (Berkeley 
2013), p. 115. 
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rakish’.6 Her work was also distinguished by its free or non-metrical lyricism 
(learned above all from Williams), fluent image-making, and marked visual 
orientation; and then, as the 1960’s went on, for the way she sought to incorporate 
into her poetry, rather like her American contemporary Adrienne Rich, her 
developing political activism.   
The visual orientation of Levertov’s poems, the idea that seeing is believing 
(to quote Charles Tomlinson, another English admirer of Williams, of the same 
generation as Levertov), leads to a celebration of presence, of immanence.7 We see 
into the life of things by first looking at that life. We ‘come into animal presence’,8 
where ‘everything that acts is actual’.9 To observe the grandeur of earth and sky is 
to be present at the ‘enactment of rites’.10 We don’t just see, we synaesthetically 
‘taste and see’.11 
life is in me, a love for 
what happens, for 
the surfaces that are their own 
interior life12 
As with Rilke, whom Levertov greatly admired, the visible surface of things is never 
superficial; it is replete with their ‘interior life’, which is an extension of the ‘life 
                                                
6 Denise Levertov, ‘The Rights’, Collected Poems [CP], ed. Paul A. Lacey and Anne 
Dewey (New York 2013), pp. 45-6 (p. 46). 
7 Charles Tomlinson, Seeing Is Believing (New York 1958). 
8 ‘Come into Animal Presence’, P, p. 23. 
9 Denise Levertov, ‘Everything that Acts Is Actual’, CP, pp. 54-5. 
10 ‘The Room’, CP, pp. 102-3 (p. 103). 
11 ‘O Taste and See’, P, p. 125. 
12 Staying Alive, CP, pp. 345-96 (p. 382). 
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[that] is in me’—or, as her older American contemporary and sometime friend 
George Oppen, another admirer of Rilke, would put it, the physical is always already 
metaphysical.13 
As Levertov’s concerns became more political, however, the problem that her 
poetry struggled with was how to make political sense of a world that the poet was 
still essentially looking at. The events that result from political decisions, such as the 
Vietnam War, seemed to drain the world of its aura of rich immanence, while the 
power structures that shape that world and the ideological apparatus that inform our 
seeing are themselves invisible. Politics will not be televised—only the horror that it 
leaves behind. 
In the poem ‘Biafra’, for example, from 1970, ‘photos of napalmed children’ 
no longer stir the viewers’ compassion: ‘Now we look slugglisly/at photos of 
children dying in Biafra’—for ‘The poisoning/called “getting used to”/has taken 
place’.14 Faltering transitions and gaps within the lines seem to imitate the jaded 
reader’s restless eye. We don’t see deeper or wider than the newspaper: 
And the news from Biafra (doesn’t make the headlines, 
not in today’s paper at all) 
doesn’t even get in past our eyes. (ibid.) 
In another poem, ‘Advent 1966’, Levertov laments how, confronted by endless 
images of atrocity,  
  my strong sight, 
my clear caressive sight, my poet’s sight I was given 
                                                
13 ‘The shock’, of the physical, is, for Oppen ‘metaphysical’. George Oppen, ‘The 
Return’, New Collected Poems ed. Michael Davidson (New York 2002), pp. 47-9 (p. 
49). 
14 Levertov, ‘Biafra’, CP, pp. 282-3. 
Different Trains 4 
that it might stir me to song, 
is blurred15 
This poem was among those cited by Charles Altieri in what is still arguably the 
best critical discussion of the poetics of Levertov’s political dilemma.16 One thing 
that we may perhaps notice in the passage immediately above is the way the poet 
attempts to counterbalance the blurring of her sight with the insistence of her voice 
(the words ‘sight’ occurs three times in the space of eight words): but the traditional 
rhetorical instrument of repetition produces on this occasion only a flat effect of 
emphasis, which is not made more penetrating by the blunt alliteration (‘Clear 
caressive’; ‘stir . . . song’) or assonance (‘my’/‘sight’—this last effect just possibly 
enlivened by echoes of the I/eye homonym).  
The responsibility of testifying to the significance of ‘life’ began to shift, as 
Levertov’s work became more consciously political, from the act of seeing to the act 
of giving voice: from what is witnessed to the witness. The poet herself was aware of 
this: ‘I found eyesight wasn’t so utterly/my way of being/as I’d supposed’, she 
writes: ‘voice’ and ‘deep listening’ now vie with it.17 There is another telling example 
of this shift in ‘The Day the Audience Walked Out on Me and Why’ (1970), where 
the speaker describes a poetry reading in a church, during which she proceeds to 
‘rap’, as she says, on the poet’s exemplary responsibility (exemplary because it 
represents our mutual responsibility) to remember and bear witness to political 
                                                
15 ‘Advent 1966’, CP, pp. 342-3 (p. 343). 
16 Charles Altieri, ‘Denise Levertov and the Limits of the Aesthetics of Presence’, 
Enlarging the Temple: New Directions in American Poetry during the 1960s (London 
1979), pp. 225-44. 
17 Levertov, ‘At the “Mass Ave Poetry Hawkers’ Reading in the Red Book Cellar’ 
(1972), CP, p. 444. 
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atrocities (the shooting of white students at Kent State University, of black students 
at Orangeburg), atrocities that are not themselves described in the poem and that, 
we may infer, were not directly seen by the poet or her ‘audience’.18 The poem bears 
witness to the poet as witness, the authority of her voice—rather than trying to get 
the reader to see what was unseen. The danger, here, for Levertov, as for any poet, is 
of taking her authority for granted—as if it sufficed, in order to write a poem, that 
one is a poet and has written poems; as if insistence (‘my . . . sight,/my . . . sight,  my 
. . . sight’) might equate to song. 
I want to argue in this essay that while Levertov’s work may not altogether 
succeed as political poetry, since it cannot bridge the gap between immanence and 
politics, or, to put it another way, it cannot connect the aesthetic apprehension of 
phenomena to invisible ideology or power, it succeeds, at its best, as a poetry of 
ethical life—by which I mean that it successfully communicates an ethical attitude or 
moral bearing; it does this most effectively, however, when the dramatic emphasis 
falls not on the poet as witness, but rather on that particularised other who, in the 
body of the poem, is witnessed or addressed—who even more than the poet or her 
voice may be said to be the occasion of the poem. Modern evil moves in such 
complicated social and political ways, Altieri argued, that Levertov was unable, 
when confronted by it, to achieve an aesthetically convincing moral realignment by 
means of visionary immanence19—but Altieri didn’t distinguish, in his discussion, 
between the immanence of being and the immanence of persons. In this essay I will 
concentrate on the immanence of persons. I draw on Emmanuel Levinas’s thought 
                                                
18 Levertov, ‘The Day the Audience Walked Out on Me, and Why’, CP, pp. 420-1.  
19 ‘The aesthetics of presence is essentially monistic, conceiving evil as basically only 
a privation, a failure to perceive correctly or to align one’s consciousness with the 
latent harmonious orders of a given scene.’ Altieri, pp. 235-6. 
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that while my politics comprises the ideological positions that I take (or else, from 
the point of view of what is often called the hermeneutics of ‘suspicion’, the positions 
that take or construct me),20 my ethics is how I comport myself to others at all times 
and prior to all ideological positions. Ethics not politics is how I come into the 
world. 
I look at two poems by Levertov from her book The Jacob’s Ladder (1961). 
Levertov regarded the first of these poems, ‘During the Eichmann Trial’, an 
ambitious poem in three parts, as her first truly political poem (Hollenberg, p. 197). I 
am going to examine the first section of the poem, which is also, I think, the best and 
most interesting part of it, and we shall see there how Levertov already interrogates 
the limitations of the visual imagination—the problems of trying to understand the 
world by looking at it or looking at others looking. I then turn to her remarkable 
poem ‘A Solitude’, the last poem in the book, where she confronts her visual bias in 
even more impressive terms. In both poems, I argue, Levertov’s essentially ethical 
orientation is brought into relief. 
* 
The trial of Adolf Eichmann was a landmark event for several reasons. Eichmann 
had been captured in Argentina, in 1960, by agents of Mossad, the Israeli secret 
intelligence service, and smuggled back to Israel. His trial took place in Jerusalem 
the following year (April-December 1961).21 Unlike the Nuremburg Trials, 
therefore, it was conducted by the representatives of the people on whom the 
Holocaust was perpetrated. Consequently it aroused enormous international 
interest, one expression of which was Hannah Arendt’s polarising account of the 
                                                
20 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven 1970), 
pp. 32-6. 
21 Deborah E. Lipstadt, The Eichmann Trial (New York 2011). 
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trial for The New Yorker magazine. One of the striking ironies about Arendt’s 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), is that it was written by 
a political philosopher who consistently distinguished between the political and the 
moral,22 and who denied that her Report contained a philosophical ‘thesis’,23 yet it has 
been called the ‘twentieth century’s most important philosophical contribution to the 
problem of evil’.24 Since it was not published until 1963, however, one year after 
Eichmann was hanged, it can’t be said to have influenced Levertov’s poem, which 
first appeared in 1961. But there is a significant parallel here with the argument I am 
making about Levertov—about how ethics becomes visible among the debris of 
politics. 
 I will concentrate on the first and longest section of ‘During the Eichmann 
Trial’: ‘When We Look Up’,25 which has an epigraph from Robert Duncan: ‘When 
we look up/each from his being’.26 The poem begins therefore by foregrounding the 
act of looking.  
He had not looked, 
pitiful man whom none 
                                                
22 See for example Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her 
Political Thought, especially ch. 5, ‘Morals and Politics in a Post-Totalitarian Age’ 
(Cambridge 1992), pp. 155-200. 
23 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1: Thinking, vol. 2: Willing (San Diego, 
1978), vol. 1, p. 3. 
24 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy 
(Princeton 2002), p. 271. 
25 Denise Levertov, ‘During the Eichmann Trial’, P, pp. 63-9 (pp. 63-5). 
26 Robert Duncan, ‘Two Dicta of William Blake: Variations’, I, Poetry 99.3 
(December 1961), p. 172. 
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pity, whom all 
must pity if they look 
 
into their own face (given  l.5 
only by glass, steel, water 
 
barely known) all 
who look up 
 
to see—how many 
faces?     How many   l.10 
 
seen in a lifetime? (Not those 
that flash by, but those 
 
into which the gaze wanders 
and is lost 
 
and returns to tell   l.15 
Here is a mystery, 
 
a person, an 
other, an I? 
 
Count them. 
Different Trains 9 
Who are five million?)  l.20 
Given what has been said about the importance of sight for Levertov, it is 
immediately significant that Eichmann ‘had not looked’—or not in the sense in 
which people ordinarily look around them, look beyond themselves, see what stares 
them in the face. With the pause at the end of the line reinforced by the comma, this 
first line has the weight of an epitaph, a monument of understatement, to sit 
alongside Arendt’s appalled summation: ‘He merely, to put the matter colloquially, 
never realised what he was doing’—never realised because he had no thought for 
others, could never put himself in the place of others, had no empathetic 
imagination.27 
 In the first four lines, Levertov tightly weaves together inflexions of ‘look’ 
and ‘pity’, so that we’re invited to consider that to look is to pity; but she then 
complicates matters by allowing the glass ‘bulletproof witness-stand’ that encloses 
Eichmann, and which is concisely imitated in the poem by the parenthesis (ll. 5-7), to 
symbolise the problem of mediation—the idea, if you will, that ‘we see through a 
glass darkly’. Eichmann in other words is not alone in his blindness: how much of 
what we ‘all’ look at do we really see? If we could only see Eichmann, wouldn’t we 
have to pity him, to pity him for not pitying—and not looking?  
It would be too simplistic to say that Levertov equates our failure to see with 
Eichmann’s. The poem’s studied lineation, the way it keeps its images apart even as 
it brings them together, and its provocative and evasive use of repetition, dangling 
identity before us yet simultaneously dissipating it, as repetition will, seem to refuse 
that simplification at the same time as the poem appears to suggest it. The next two 
sections of ‘During the Eichmann Trial’, ‘The Peachtree’ and ‘Crystal Night’, depict 
                                                
27 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963; New 
York 1994), p. 287. 
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the kind of notorious actions that have made it impossible for us to see Eichmann 
plain: the murder of a boy for picking fruit from Eichmann’s garden, and the terror 
and mayhem of Kristallnacht; actions that are inseparable in effect from the 
bulletproof screen behind which Eichmann stands, actions that remind us why the 
screen is there. But in this opening section the visual metaphor invites us to look at, 
or think about, the relationship between different kinds of moral blindness, without 
necessarily equating them; and it also makes Eichmann a test-case of our willingness to 
look at others as well as at ourselves and to see ourselves in others: ‘Here is a 
mystery, //a person, an / other, an I?’ 
The suspense produced throughout the poem by enjambement enables the 
phrase ‘how many’ in lines 9-10 to refer back for a moment to the ‘all/who look 
up’—how many of all those who look to see, see?—before it becomes clear that it refers, 
in fact, to the question of how many are ‘seen’; ‘how many’ thus shifts in the blink of 
an eye from being the subject of the verbs to look and see (with their evocative 
doubling—as if the words need glasses) to being their object, which is revealed, with 
fitting irony, by the unseen ‘faces’ at line 10 (resonating with ‘their own face’ from 
line 5). This lightning play of ideas takes another dazzling turn with the transition 
from ‘an I’ to ‘Count them’—count the ‘I’s—‘Who are five million?’ (with three ‘i’s in 
the last two words). 
We also come up against the quiet oddness of the question, not what is five 
million, what does that mean as a figure? but ‘Who are five million?’—a question that 
tries as it were to give everyone a face. Nowadays we tend to associate the figure of 
six million with the number of Jews murdered in the Holocaust, but that hasn’t 
always been the case.28 ‘The Germans killed five million Jews,’ Raul Hilberg wrote 
                                                
28 See for instance ‘Holocaust Facts: Where Does the Figure of Six Million Victims 
Come From?’, Haaretz (11 August, 2013). 
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emphatically in 1961, the year of the trial, in his monumental and ground-breaking 
study, The Destruction of the European Jews.29 We go from the problem of human 
mass, which is a generalized feature of modern life (as in The Waste Land’s ‘So many, 
I had not thought death had undone so many,’ a line that seems to me to be echoed by 
Levertov),30 to the specificity of Nazi mass murder. If we’re not convinced about the 
number of the dead, the poem challenges us to ‘Count them.’ Whereupon it switches 
directly to Eichmann’s own testimony, in the first person: 
‘I was used from the nursery 
to obedience 
 
all my life . . . 
Corpselike 
 
obedience.’ 
The ‘I’ stands out again. The reference to the nursery prepares the way for the story 
of the boy victim in part two of the poem and his grim encounter with ‘mister death’ 
(P, pp. 65-6). Levertov’s positioning of the quotation, however, gives it a subtle and 
revealing ambiguity: ‘I was used . . . to obedience’ could mean, and in this context 
surely ought to mean, I was used to being obeyed—used, in effect, to rendering others 
‘corpselike’—and not merely like. But what it really refers to is something that was 
to outrage Hannah Arendt in her ‘report’ on the trial: Eichmann’s dying protestation 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/features/.premium-1.540880. Accessed 9 August, 
2016. 
29 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (1961; New Haven 2003), vol. 3, 
p. 1059. Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem was heavily indebted to Hilberg’s work. 
30 T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land (1922), l. 63 (my emphasis). 
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that in murdering hundreds of thousands of Jews he had simply been obeying ‘duty’, 
‘orders’ and the ‘law’.31 Levertov contrasts Eichmann’s unreal corpse with the real 
corpses of five million Jews.  
As I have said, it may be that by figuring Eichmann’s aberration as a failure 
to see, much as Arendt cast it as an ‘inability to think’ (Arendt, p. 49), and then 
tentatively connecting that to everybody else’s failure to see, including the failure to 
see Eichmann (where to see is to ‘pity’, to ‘see into the life of things’, to 
compassionate with their life and death), exposes the limitations of the metaphor: it 
is too symmetrical. It implies a simplistic moral equivalence, as if my everyday 
blindness were essentially the same as Eichmann’s, when the salient point is surely 
that Eichmann, out of what we might want to call blindness, facilitated the murder of 
five million Jews, while our everyday blindness murders no one. The failure to see 
cannot be a sufficient cause by itself, or we’d all be murderers. The responsibility lies 
with Eichmann, not with the failure to see. 
This reservation notwithstanding, I want to emphasise the significance of the 
pressure that Levertov is putting on the idea of looking, and one thing that I haven’t 
discussed so far is this image of looking as looking up—an idea which is itself placed 
up, at the very top of the poem. Levertov takes it, first of all, from Duncan, but it also 
becomes, as she deploys it, an allusion to the arrangement of the courtroom and the 
raised-up position of the ‘bulletproof/witness-stand of glass’. In developing the idea 
of looking at someone as looking up—looking up, moreover, at a mass-murderer—
                                                
31 Arendt was also struck the by same image that struck Levertov: Eichmann, she 
wrote, ‘became completely muddled, and ended by stressing alternately the virtues 
and the vices of blind obedience, or the “obedience of corpses,” Kadavergehorsam, as he 
himself called it’ (Arendt, p.135; my emphasis). 
 
Different Trains 13 
with its connotations of the abasement and self-transcendence of the viewer, 
Levertov is exploring an idea that is also fundamental to Levinas’s ethics of 
attention. Levinas holds that when we respond to the other, which is to say, to the 
appeal of the other (for the other appeals to us by just being there)—‘a solicitation 
that concerns me by its destitution and its Height’32—the angle of our gaze is, 
automatically, morally elevated; that is to say, we ‘look up/each from his being’: no 
matter how wretched the other might be, he or she confronts us as from a height. 
The other humbles us into our humanity—brings us, figuratively, yet also through a 
kind of moral-spiritual geometry, to our knees. According to Levinas, here is the 
beginning of ethical life. We look up at the face of the other and our gaze is carried 
above and beyond it—to that face that is not the visible anatomical face. 
The impossibility of seeing Eichmann plain, behind his glass cage, is 
connected in the poem to the idea, expounded most powerfully perhaps by 
Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov, that guilt starts with me—with one’s own self 
first: ‘each of us is guilty in everything and before everyone, and I most of all’;33 
which is also a leitmotif in the work of Levinas.34 In ‘When We Look Up’, the idea is 
stated most baldly in the closing lines: 
Pity this man who saw it 
whose obedience continued— 
 
                                                
32 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1961), trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh 1969), p. 200. 
33 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa 
Volokhonsky (New York 1992), p. 289. 
34 See Richard Cohen, Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy: Interpretation after Levinas 
(Cambridge 2001). 
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he, you, I, which shall I say? 
He stands 
 
isolate in a bulletproof 
witness-stand of glass, 
 
a cage, where we may view 
ourselves, an apparition 
 
telling us something he 
does not know: we are members 
 
one of another. 
These stark verses may lack the sophistication of the opening twenty lines, with 
their brilliant interplay of lineation, metaphor and repetition, but there are still some 
touches worth noting: the repetition of ‘I’ (‘he, you, I, which shall I say?’) seems to 
underline once and for all that throughout this poem, the ‘I’ has been haunted by the 
Ei sound of Eichmann. It is captured one final time in ‘isolate’. The oblique internal 
rhyme of ‘he’ and ‘we’ in the last three lines makes way for the still quieter echo of 
‘members’ in ‘another’, where the dying fall of that unstressed final syllable is set off, 
contradictorily, by the solemnity, the weight, that comes from its being the 
concluding phrase. 
* 
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‘I think too that we are members of each other. But what a poem it would be in 
which one saw and tasted that!’ (George Oppen to Denise Levertov,13 April, 1963)35 
 
 
In the final poem of The Jacob’s Ladder, ‘A Solitude’, Levertov again took up the 
question of what constitutes looking, or not looking, the encounter with another and 
the nature of moral blindness. Despite its conspicuous position in the book, ‘A 
Solitude’ has received scarcely any critical attention, yet it seems to me to be one of 
Levertov’s greatest poems:36  
A blind man. I can stare at him 
ashamed, shameless. Or does he know it?  
No, he is in a great solitude.   
 
O, strange joy,  
to gaze my fill at a stranger’s face.   l.5 
No, my thirst is greater than before.37   
The poem begins with something like the question with which the Eichmann poem 
began: what does it mean to look up, ‘each from his being’, at someone who for one 
                                                
35 The Selected Letters of George Oppen, ed. Rachel Blau DuPlessis (Durham N. C. 
1990), p. 81. 
36 One exception was James Wright who reviewed The Jacob’s Ladder in The 
Minnesota Review and drew comparison with Rilke. ‘A Solitude’, he wrote, ‘is a 
special joy to those who have always felt the deep gravity which underlies Miss 
Levertov’s work . . . “A Solitude” will outlive misreaders, and categorizers, and her, 
and me.’ James Wright, ‘From “Gravity and Incantation”’ (1962), Denise Levertov: 
Selected Criticism, pp. 18-9. 
37 Levertov, ‘A Solitude’, P, pp. 70-72 (ll. 1-6). 
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reason or another is unable to look. Of course, there is no suggestion here that the 
blind man is blind in the same way that Eichmann was—blind to evil. But the poem 
has begun by raising once again the question of what it means to think from the 
standpoint of the other—to think and to feel from and with. One important 
difference, however, is that now the speaker abandons the detached and disembodied 
point of view of the Eichmann poem and instead puts her own responses and 
assumptions on the line, monitoring her vacillation between (and her choice of 
words is an interesting one) shame and shamelessness. Unlike the Eichmann poem, 
therefore, where there is a troublingly neat attempt to relate the moral insensibility 
of Eichmann, his indifference to the other, to the insensibility of human beings 
generally, here the problem of moral insensibility, of the failure to submit one’s 
attention to the other in his otherness, his difference, sits squarely between the poet-
speaker and the man who is the object of her gaze. Who exactly is blind here, the 
poem asks, the speaker who is looking or the man who cannot see? As if to concede 
that every encounter is to some extent unique, there is no precipitate extrapolation 
to humanity at large.  
The idea that the speaker’s ‘gaze’ is driven by ‘thirst’ underlines the 
possibility that it is she who is blind—for thirst, like taste, strictly speaking, cannot 
see. The poem continues to play teasingly with the faculties of sense-perception, 
drawing attention to how we use them, too easily, as metaphors for one another, 
piling them up, it seems, like a whole theory of correspondences, but also 
recognising simultaneously, in the same breath, how they don’t finally correspond to 
one another at all.38 Being blind is not the same as being deaf or dumb, but the 
                                                
38 Levertov’s exhortation to ‘taste and see’ (1964) would be another striking 
instance, the mixed metaphor gesturing to correspondences at the same time as it 
points up the lack of real symmetry. 
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thought that it might be (the way in which we too readily associate one disability 
with another) seems fleetingly to cross the speaker’s mind:  
In his world he is speaking  
almost aloud. His lips move.  
Anxiety plays about them. And now joy   
 
of some sort trembles into a smile.    l.10 
A breeze I can't feel  
crosses that face as if it crossed water.   
 
The train moves uptown, pulls in and  
pulls out of the local stops. Within its loud  
jarring movement a quiet,      l.15 
 
the quiet of people not speaking,  
some of them eyeing the blind man  
only a moment though, not thirsty like me,   
 
and within that quiet his  
different quiet, not quiet at all, a tumult   l.20 
of images, but what are his images,   
 
he is blind? He doesn't care  
that he looks strange, showing  
his thoughts on his face like designs of light   
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flickering on water, for he doesn't know   l.25 
what look is.  
I see he has never seen.  
The word ‘No’ that began lines 3 and 6 set the tone. The writing now edges 
forwards through its concentrated qualifications and corrections, as the speaker 
strains to drink up each baffling sign of this other’s other life. She is intent upon him 
and we feel that. Despite the loudness of the train, she hears, in her alerted state, the 
quiet of their fellow passengers not speaking, only occasionally staring: ‘and within 
that quiet his/different quiet, not quiet at all, a tumult/of images, but what are his 
images’. The internal rhymes that bind the poem together, the i’s and y’s of blind, 
quiet, eyeing, only, thirsty, seem to intensify by their narrow range the atmosphere of 
hushed concentration. 
 The description of the man’s face, likening it to a surface of water that is 
disturbed by a flickering breeze or, in a striking phrase, ‘designs of light’, may owe 
something to Rilke’s early poem ‘Die Erblindende’.39 This body of water also answers 
                                                
39 ‘Auf ihren hellen Augen die sich freuten/war Licht von außen wie auf einem Teich’ 
(‘upon her eyes, which were radiant with joy,/light played as on the surface of a 
pool’). ‘Die Erblindende’ (‘Going Blind’), The Selected Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke, 
trans. Stephen Mitchell (New York 1989), pp. 32-3. In the essay ‘Rilke as Mentor’, 
Levertov writes of how Rilke both confirmed and deepened her insights regarding 
‘solitude’: ‘solitude as necessary for the poet’s inner development, for that selfhood 
which must be in order to experience all the multifold otherness of life.’ New & 
Selected Essays (New York 1992), pp. 231-8 (p. 234). ‘Die Erblindende’ does not feature 
in the bilingual edition, Rainer Maria Rilke, Fifty Selected Poems, trans. C. F. 
MacIntyre (Berkeley 1941), which was Levertov’s first encounter with the poet 
(‘Rilke as Mentor’, p. 232). 
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to, and yet keeps a discreet distance from, the speaker’s indecorous ‘thirst’—which is 
greedy, embarrassing, or, as the poem says, ‘shameless’, and contrasted with the 
more polite curiosity of the other passengers, who are ‘not thirsty like me’. The 
speaker’s confidence in her judgement, her inference, as when she declares ‘I see he 
has never seen’, corresponds to something exorbitant in Levertov’s visionary 
presumption—but the poem doesn’t hide that and gains from exposing it. More 
observations, surmises and corrections follow:  
And now he rises, he stands at the door ready,  
knowing his station is next. Was he counting?  
No, that was not his need.   
 
When he gets out I get out.  
“Can I help you towards the exit?”  
“Oh, alright.” An indifference.   
 
But instantly, even as he speaks,  
even as I hear indifference, his hand  
goes out, waiting for me to take it,   
 
and now we hold hands like children.  
His hand is warm and not sweaty,  
the grip firm, it feels good.   
The details are vivid—rich yet unfinished, as if the speaker were trying to draw 
someone, in a few pencil strokes, executed at full tilt. If he wasn’t counting, how did 
he know that it was his stop? We’re not told. His knowledge remains his. Was it 
only the speaker’s thirst, her curiosity, that caused her to get out of the train when 
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he got out? What is the relationship between her ‘thirst’ and his perceived ‘need’? 
The contradiction between the blind man’s apparent ‘indifference’ to her offer of 
‘help’ and the contrary action of ‘his hand’, which (like the speaker and the man 
himself leaving the carriage) ‘goes out’, is a brilliantly vivid detail. Had she expected 
his hand to feel ‘sweaty’ or not ‘good’—and if so why? Because he is blind?  
And when we have passed through the turnstile,  
he going first, his hand at once  
waits for mine again.   
 
‘Here are the steps. And here we turn  
to the right. More stairs now.’ We go  
up into sunlight. He feels that,   
 
the soft air. ‘A nice day,  
isn't it?’ says the blind man. Solitude  
walks with me, walks   
 
beside me, he is not with me, he continues  
his thoughts alone. But his hand and mine  
know one another,   
 
it’s as if my hand were gone forth  
on its own journey. I see him  
across the street, the blind man,   
 
and now he says he can find his way. He knows  
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where he is going, it is nowhere, it is filled  
with presences. He says, I am. 
Again the blind man seems to take the speaker by surprise, this time with his 
reference to the ‘nice day’. The speaker sees that it is a nice day, and she has also 
seen the man respond, involuntarily, to the warm soft air. But it’s as if she doesn’t 
expect him to say it—as if saying or knowing it’s a nice day (as if she knows better 
than he knows what he knows) were the preserve of those who see. There are more 
qualifications: ‘Solitude/walks with me, walks/beside me, he is not with me, he 
continues’. The poet’s hand proves more reliable than her eye. And there might be 
some reference here to the writer’s hand—the art of writing as being, like the art of 
drawing, something more or wiser than the art of just seeing. 
 After another final flurry of contradictions, as the speaker gets ahead of 
herself again (‘He knows/where he is going, it is nowhere, it is filled’), the short 
concluding sentence of the poem leaves us with a puzzle: ‘He says, I am’. For the 
first time in the poem, yet twice in this final stanza, what someone ‘says’ is not 
presented in quotation marks, as plain direct speech. And, in the final instance, there 
is also this slightly portentous emboldening of the text, which, since it doesn’t serve 
here to help us identify the tone in which the words might be uttered, seems instead, 
as often in such cases, to undermine itself, as if the poet doesn’t trust the words to 
speak up by themselves. One might well read the finale as an error of judgement on 
Levertov’s part—an intrusion of the egotistical sublime at the death, usurping the 
place of the blind man, whose portrait had been, until this point, rendered with a 
combination of passion, compassion and finesse reminiscent of a Rembrandt sketch. 
Is this another unfortunate example, in one of her finest poems, of the kind of empty 
or unearned assertion Altieri complained about (Altieri, p. 234)? It may indeed be.  
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But I want to consider another way of reading it, one that is made possible, that the 
reader has been prepared for, by the poem’s contradictions and bifurcations.  
The phrase ‘he says he can find his way’ doesn’t pose too many problems. 
The dropping of the speech marks here could almost evoke the man going out of 
earshot, muttering to himself as much as to the speaker, as he recovers his 
independence, finds ‘his way’ back to himself (see the earlier lines: ‘In his world he is 
speaking/almost aloud’, ll. 7-8). But it is very difficult indeed to imagine this man, 
who had been no less banal than anybody else about the weather, saying, out of the 
blue, something so pompously metaphysical as those two final words, as if he’d been 
transmogrified suddenly into a living breathing instance of Coleridge’s ‘infinite I 
AM’.40 When we look closely, however, we see that the poem doesn’t actually say 
that he literally says them. In fact, the speaker tells us that by this point in the poem 
he has crossed to the other side of the street from where the speaker stands (she 
‘see[s] him/across the street’). Even if he did speak, the chances are that she 
wouldn’t know. Since he must be walking away from her, she could only really be 
looking at his profile or his back—blind to most of his face and especially his mouth. 
So what are we to make of the last four words? I take the poem to be saying that it is 
the man’s existence—or rather his existence and the speaker’s encounter with it, 
both—that is doing the saying here. His life, body, motion, ‘solitude’, his otherness 
from her and from what she could not help herself assuming that he was—all this is 
what ‘says’. He insists, so to speak, upon himself. But it’s by no means clear that this 
utterance takes the form of words that are spoken from his mouth. The utterance is 
rather everything about him that declares him to be someone other than the speaker. 
There is, to be sure, the distinct possibility that the speaker takes him to have 
spoken those two last words: ‘He says, I am.’ And again the poem itself, with its bold 
                                                
40 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (1817), ch. 13. 
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letters, speaks too loudly, as if someone, perhaps the blind man, or the reader, were 
deaf. Meanwhile the comma cuts across the sentence like the street—two words 
either side of it. The blind man’s saying, and, as distinct from that, the speaker’s 
saying what he says part company—just as the speaker and the blind man do. The 
ambiguity intensifies—to include even the possibility that it is the speaker who is (‘I 
am’), the blind man who ‘says’. And the blind man’s saying, precisely because we do 
not know what else it says—whether it says anything more than what the encounter 
had, by this point, already told us—acquires a kind of indefeasible, incorrigible 
opacity. The luminous opacity of mere saying—of a speech without words, existence 
as utterance rather than as being. The ontological ‘I am’ reverts, by contrast, to the 
speaker—who doesn’t say, who merely, monumentally, solitarily, is. The encounter 
is already over before the poem ends. And the poem in the end is stuck with itself. It 
is. Nevertheless, it is witness to an encounter—one that has crossed it like that 
image of the breeze described near the beginning of the poem, crossing the blind 
man’s face ‘as if it crossed water’. The speaker collapses back into that complacency 
of being from which she had temporarily ‘looked up’—speaking and encountering 
are here, as they are in Levinas, prior to, more powerful and more revelatory, and, as 
we see, more open-ended, than the closure/disclosure of being.41  
* 
There is a certain appositeness in the fact that ‘During the Eichmann Trial’ concerns 
a man whose peculiar ingenuity expressed itself in arranging the deportation, by 
train, of ‘millions to their deaths’, while ‘A Solitude’ begins on a train and portrays a 
man whose physical disability (‘I see he has never seen’), if he had lived under the 
                                                
41 For Levinas, as Cohen aptly puts it, ‘To be good—to spend an hour of one’s own 
precious time, once a week, reading to a blind person—is both to be and to be beyond 
being’ (Cohen, p. 14; my emphasis). 
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Nazis, might have cost him his life.42 But the relationship between ‘During the 
Eichmann Trial’ and ‘A Solitude’, the two final poems in The Jacob’s Ladder, is not 
one of superficial correspondences or clever inversions. The blind man does not 
occupy the position occupied by Eichmann vis-à-vis the speaker. He is not accused, 
he is not on trial—nor, as the poem makes plain, is he to be pitied (Eichmann by 
contrast is a ‘pitiful man whom/none pity’ yet all ‘must’). Instead, both poems deal 
with solitariness and isolation, separateness, otherness, seeing and not seeing, with 
the phenomenon of appearance as appearing-to: we appear to someone—or as 
Hannah Arendt would say, to multitudes of someones. Both poems are studies in 
relating or relationality and of the role of imagination in relating, and in failing or 
presuming to relate. But whereas ‘When We Look Up’ takes our common humanity 
as a given, a commonality that is set off by Eichmann, who failed to see it, and whose 
evil is somehow inextricable from that failure, ‘A Solitude’ discovers our common 
humanity in the ramifications of what we do not have in common—in the 
asymmetry of the encounter, in which the assertion of human being that constitutes 
its climax is manifestly not something felt in common but is only the barren 
iteration of an emphatic isolate ‘I am’. What underlines the poem’s passing greatness 
is precisely this final yet by no means comprehensive falling short. 
 There are a several ways in which we might draw upon the thought of 
Levinas in order to develop the significance of the conjuncture I describe. I’ve 
already mentioned the idea of moral height, the asymmetry of the encounter, the 
priority of ethics over ontology, and the enigma of the face, which latter is 
inseparable, for Levinas, from the primacy of saying. ‘The face speaks’, Levinas 
writes (p. 66). His celebrated notion of the face seems especially apt, for while 
Levertov almost certainly knew nothing of Levinas’s thought at the time of writing, 
                                                
42 David Cesarani, Eichmann: His Life and Crimes (London 2004), pp. 11. 
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the poem seems peculiarly alive to the idea that the face is not the physiological face; 
or, rather, it presents a remarkably revealing confirmation of, or variation on, that 
idea, heightened by the concentrated seeing that the speaker bestows on the man 
she’s staring at. The face is not the eyes; nor is it even centred in the eyes—much as 
we might like to think it is; much as the painter, in especial, thinks it is. In 
Levertov’s poem, the light is not concentrated in the blind man’s eye but passes 
across the whole of his face; his face, we might say—in Levinas’s sense of the term—
lights up his face and disappears. Nor can we presume to judge what face the speaker 
presents to the blind man—in what light she appears to him; her face as he finds it. 
Levertov’s biographer Donna Hollenberg reports that Levertov would come 
to admire Totality and Infinity, Levinas’s most celebrated work, which was, by 
coincidence, also published in 1961, the year of The Jacob’s Ladder and the Eichmann 
trial (Hollenberg, p. 47). But if Levinas’s book appeared too late to influence The 
Jacob’s Ladder, it is worth noting that both he and Levertov were by this time 
already influenced by the work of Martin Buber, from which Levertov’s book took 
its epigraph. We might also note, to complete the circle, that Arendt declared that 
Buber ‘was the only philosopher to go on public record on the subject of Eichmann’s 
execution’ (Arendt, p. 252). 
I want to end by developing another aspect of Levinas’s thought that seems 
peculiarly relevant to ‘A Solitude’ and also helps to underline the profound 
connection between it and the Eichmann poem. For where, one might reasonably 
ask, is the question of evil in ‘A Solitude’, which was so fundamental to the trial of 
Adolf Eichmann? I turn back by way of answer to the feeling of shame, with which 
the poem begins; the speaker stares ‘ashamed, shameless’—the words contiguous, 
neither getting the better of the other, shame in fact to the fore in both, whether 
acknowledged or brazened out; and along with shame the associated question of help 
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(‘Can I help you. . . ?’). For Levinas, my shame in the face of the other is testimony to 
the appalling fact that the life of the other is in my hands—the life of the other hangs 
from my life not by a monkey-rope, as Herman Melville thought, but by a thread.43 I 
feel that I could murder or injure the other from one moment to the next—and that’s 
not a possibility that ever really goes away, as long as the other is there before me, 
face to face or in my mind’s eye. This power that I feel before the other—which 
comes from the other’s unseen dependence on me, on my not putting an end to him, 
or to her, which embarrasses my power, shows it up for the arbitrary thing it is—is 
one source of my shame, whose other source is, at the same time, my desire for the 
other, my ‘thirst’. It is out of the depths of this ‘shame’ that the offer of help reaches 
out its ‘hand’. 
Levinas expresses this movement, which is also the very movement of 
Levertov’s poem, as follows: 
The Other is not initially a fact, is not an obstacle, does not threaten me with 
death; he is desired in my shame . . . It is necessary to have the idea of 
infinity, the idea of the perfect, as Descartes would say, in order to know 
one’s own imperfection. The idea of the perfect is not an idea but a desire; it 
is the welcoming of the Other, the commencement of my moral 
consciousness, which calls in question my freedom. Thus this way of 
measuring oneself against infinity is not a theoretical consideration; it is 
accomplished as shame, where freedom discovers itself murderous in its very 
exercise . . .  
 Conscience welcomes the Other. It is the revelation of a resistance to 
my powers that does not counter them as a greater force, but calls in 
question the naïve right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living 
                                                
43 Herman Melville, Moby Dick; or, The Whale (1851), ch. 72. 
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being. Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels 
itself to be arbitrary and violent. (Levinas, p. 84) 
The speaker’s desire, her ‘thirst’, is, in Levinas’s words, her desire for the infinite (as 
the inescapable biblical resonance of Levertov’s metaphor makes clear), which she 
‘welcomes’ in the blind man facing her—a ‘revelation of a resistance to’ her ‘powers 
that does not counter them as a greater force’ (which he is plainly not), but rather 
‘calls in question’ their ‘naïve right’; pulling the carpet out from underneath her 
‘glorious spontaneity’ as a poet and a ‘living being’. Freedom feels itself to be 
‘arbitrary and violent’.  
After Levinas, I know of no more eloquent description of shame than Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s, who, though writing in what seems to be a very different 
context, expressly connects it to ‘pogroms’ and ‘survivors’ guilt’: ‘One of the 
strangest features of shame’, she writes, ‘is the way bad treatment of someone else, 
bad treatment by someone else, someone else’s embarrassment, stigma, debility, 
blame or pain, seemingly having nothing to do with me, can so readily flood me—
assuming that I’m a shame-prone person—with this sensation whose very 
suffusiveness seems to delineate my precise, individual outlines in the most isolating 
way imaginable.’44 Sedgwick’s ‘shame-prone person’ is precisely, for Levinas, the 
ethical person, whose susceptibility connects her at the same time as it isolates her.45 
 Shame might also offer us, finally, another way of thinking about the 
Eichmann poem. There is the shamelessness, most obviously, of Eichmann himself. 
‘He had not looked’, Levertov begins. She doesn’t immediately spell out at what, 
                                                
44 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, ‘Queer Performativity: Henry James’s The Art of the 
Novel, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, 1 (1993), pp. 1-16. 
45 As Judith Butler puts it: ‘Levinas would say that prior susceptibility is already the 
ethical.’ Judith Butler, Senses of the Subject (New York 2015), p. 200 (n. 6). 
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letting the significance of the phrase expand indefinitely, to take in something of the 
landscape that Arendt had also been addressing when she described Eichmann’s 
complete lack of empathetic imagination (Arendt, pp. 47-9). He had not thought to 
look—into the other’s face or from his point of view. He was not brought to his 
senses by the other—or in Levinas’s terms, brought to his finitude by the infinity in 
the other. And just as he was a man who was oblivious to the transcendence of the 
other (who discovered in himself no desire for the infinite or idea of the perfect), so 
he was a man who had no hand in what he did—a man who was shameless. ‘He did 
his duty, as he told the police and the court over and over again; he not only obeyed 
orders, he also obeyed the law’ (Arendt, p. 135). As he gave himself up to the 
principal of obedience, he claimed to lose all feeling: ‘as the months and the years 
went by, he lost the need to feel anything at all’ (ibid). His obedience became 
cadaverous (Kadavergehorsam), as he said. His actions didn’t touch him—or in 
Levertov’s terms, he ‘signs papers/then eats’.  
 Hollenberg writes that Levertov ‘indicts both Eichmann and her audience in 
the free world’ (Hollenberg, p. 194). Indicts, I think, is fair—the poet also indicts 
herself, as part of that free world. But the feeling of shame, in the sense in which 
Levinas understands it, the sense in which it is apparent in ‘A Solitude’, is not, I 
think, an explicit feature of the Eichmann poem—and that is presumably because 
Eichmann felt none. He was not humiliated by the power of life and death that he 
enjoyed over others; he was not brought to his knees by something infinite in one or 
other of his victims; he did not ‘look up’. When we finally discover our 
murderousness, our freedom is a shameful thing. Shame exposes our susceptibility 
and divests us of our solipsism. Accordingly, the fact that Eichmann felt no shame 
acts as a kind of prohibition on where imagination might presume to tread; for, 
confronted with Eichmann’s shamelessness, our shame—the poet’s shame—is not, 
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and cannot be, the point. Levertov can only look on, in pity, while she interrogates 
the limitations of looking and of pity. 
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